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COMMENTS]

Administrative Law Judges and the Code
of Judicial Conduct: A Need for
Regulated Ethics
Just as we regulate the filing of pleadings and the admissibility
of evidence, so must we regulate the conduct of those who ultimately judge the pleadings and evidence.'
How can I expect to win this case when the Department of Labor is my accuser, prosecutor, and judge?2

I. Introduction
Society depends upon the ethical responsibility of those who sit
in judgment to achieve fairness and justice in an adversarial system.'
Although judges must abide by standards of ethical conduct proscribed by the Code of Judicial Conduct (CJC),' no such uniform
I. S. LUBET, BEYOND REPROACH: ETHICAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
TIVITIES OF STATE AND FEDERAL JUDGES 5 (1984).

AC-

2. Comment of a pro se litigant defending himself against charges brought by the Department of Labor. This statement exemplifies the public perception of administrative law
judges as being biased and partial to their employing agency. See E. THOMAS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGES: THE CORPS ISSUE 5 (1987).
3. S. LUBET, supra note I, at 5. "The value of any system purporting to utilize an unbiased trier of fact, whether titled 'trial judge,' 'administrative law judge,' 'hearing examiner,' or
'commissioner,' rests on the integrity of the individual occupying the position." See Lussier,
The Role of the Article I Trial Judge, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 775, 778-79 (1984).
4. The seven canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct (CJC) provide:
Canon I: A Judge Should Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the
Judiciary
Canon 2: A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All His Activities
Canon 3: A Judge Should Perform the Duties of His Office Impartially and
Diligently
Canon 4: A Judge May Engage in Activities to Improve the Law, the Legal
System, and the Administration of Justice
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restraint exists for administrative law judges (AU's). AL's adjudicate significant controversies between administrative agencies and
the public; these proceedings resemble typical judicial court actions.5

The varieties of disputes heard by ALJ's range from the classic
agency licensing and ratemaking cases to economic regulation,

health care, welfare, disability, and environmental matters. 6 AL's
are recognized as being functionally comparable to trial judges,7 and
AL's decisions have considerable impact upon the lives of most
Americans.' Their powers, duties, and status have been the subject
of debate on several occasions by state and federal courts., Nevertheless, due to their status as agency employees under the executive

branch of government and their lack of complete independence,
ALJ's are not held to the same ethical code as trial judges."0
Ethical standards for AL's are necessary due to their unique
position in an expanding administrative society. The employer-employee relationship between agencies and ALJ's gives rise to a public
Canon 5: A Judge Should Regulate His Extra-Judicial Activities to Minimize the Risk of Conflict with His Judicial Duties
Canon 6: A Judge Should Regularly File Reports of Compensation Received for Quasi-Judicial and Extra-Judicial Activities
Canon 7: A Judge Should Refrain from Political Activity Inappropriate to
His Judicial Office
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1984)

[hereinafter MODEL CODE].

The 1990 proposed revision to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct changes "should" to
"shall" in each canon to express mandatory, as opposed to aspirational, standards. In addition,
Canons 4, 5, and 6, all of which relate to extra-judicial activities of judges, are proposed to be
combined into a new Canon 4: "A judge shall so conduct the judge's extra-judicial activities as
to minimize the risk of conflict with judicial obligations." The new Canon 5 of the proposed
1990 CJC, concerning political activity, would replace Canon 7 of the 1984 CJC. MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990) (Final Draft, Nov. 1989) [hereinafter ABA PROPOSED
DRAFT].
5. E. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 1.
6. Simon, For ALJ's, Obscurity is Ending, 5 NAT'L LJ., June 6, 1983, at I, col. 4. See
also E. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 5.
7. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978). In Butz, the Supreme Court held that administrative law judges were entitled to the same level of absolute immunity as trial judges.
The Court stated that "[tihere can be little doubt that the role of the modern federal hearing
examiner or administrative law judge . . . is 'functionally comparable' to that of a judge." Id.
at 513.
8. See M. RICH & W. BRUCAR, THE CENTRAL PANEL SYSTEM FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGES: A SURVEY OF SEVEN STATES 2 (1983). "Like death and taxes (both of which,
incidentally, are matters of agency concern) the agencies reach everyone." 1 F. COOPER,
STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 3 (1965).
9. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners
Conference, 345 U.S. 128 (1953); Riss & Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 907 (1951); WongYang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950); Benton v. United States, 488 F.2d 1017 (Ct. Cl.
1973); Myers v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Labor & Indus., 312 Pa. Super. 61, 458 A.2d 235
(1983).
10. ABA PROPOSED DRAFT, supra note 4, at 42. Administrative courts are considered to
be Article I courts. Other notable Article I courts are the Tax Court, 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (1988)
and the court of claims, 23 U.S.C. 171 (1988).
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perception that ALJ's are not unbiased or impartial judges.1 As the
ALJ's role continues to evolve and the administrative process becomes more judicial, the need for uniform ethical guidelines becomes
a compelling concern. 2 A recent proposal by the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility would give the states an opportunity to address this concern."3
Pursuant to the ABA's proposed revision of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, the section governing compliance would allow each adopting jurisdiction the option of electing to make the CJC applicable to
state administrative law judges. 4
This Comment explores the implications posed by the virtual
lack of a binding ethical code for administrative law judges. Part II
analyzes the Code of Judicial Conduct applicable to all judges and
judicial officers, and considers the reasoning behind the current inapplicability of the CJC to ALJ's. Part III examines the current status
of the ALJ in both the federal and state context. The functions and
duties performed by ALJ's are compared with those carried out by
the Article III and state judiciaries, which are bound by the CJC.
Part IV addresses how the states have responded to questions of ALJ
impropriety and conludes that indiscriminate application of the
Code of Judicial Conduct to AL's is undesirable. The inadequacies
of the present system and attempted changes are discussed in Part
V. Finally, Part VI advocates that Pennsylvania elect to make the
CJC applicable to state AL's. This proposal is evaluated in light of
separation of powers concerns, and recommends that such an adoption of the CJC in Pennsylvania is not only feasible, but is desirable.
II.

The Code of Judicial Conduct

A. Background
The roots of the modern Code of Judicial Conduct can be
traced to the Canons of Judicial Ethics, formulated by the American
11. E. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 5. This is perhaps the most serious and fundamental
problem because it directly relates to the structure of the administrative hearing system.
12. See Michigan Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Informal Op. CI-351
(1978).
13. See generally ABA PROPOSED DRAFT, supra note 4.
14. Id. (preface). The American Bar Association Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility introduced a comprehensive draft revision of the Code of Judicial
Conduct in May 1989 for comment. The proposed revisions are set forth in the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct (1990), Final Draft, November 1989. Following submission to the ABA
House of Delegates in February 1990 for approval, the draft was withdrawn until the August
1990 meeting. Proposed amendments may be filed until April 6, 1990.
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Bar Association (ABA) in 1924.15 Although the Canons served a
useful purpose, by 1969 it became apparent that they were difficult
to apply to many increasingly complex ethical problems and lacked
an appropriate method of enforcement. 6 The ABA recognized the
limited value of a code of conduct that only suggested guidelines for
appropriate judicial behavior, and determined that a more specific
and enforceable code was necessary.1 7 The resulting Code of Judicial

Conduct 8 is mandatory upon judges and contains specific regulations and restrictions on judicial, 19 quasi-judicial,20 and extra-judicial 1 behavior. 2 The Code consists of broad statements designated

.as Canons, and sets forth specific rules supplemented by a nonbinding commentary. Most jurisdictions have incorporated the CJC by
statute or court rule.2
15. See ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS (1924); MODEL CODE, supra note 4. See
also S. LUBET, supra note 1, at 4.
16. Seymour, The Code of Judicial Conduct from the Point of View of a Member of
the Bar, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 352. The controversies that arose over the activities and conduct
of Supreme Court Justices Fortas and Douglas helped to demonstrate the inadequacies of the
existing Canons. Id. The completion of the ABA's Code of Professional Responsibility for
lawyers also encouraged the promulgation of a new code for judges. Id. See also Martineau,
Enforcement of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 410. "It seems clear from
this language that the drafters of the Canons did not contemplate that they were preparing an
enforceable set of rules." Id.
17. See ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS, preamble (1969). The preamble to the Canons spoke in general terms, requesting that the "spirit" of the adopted Canons be a guide and
reminder for all judges. Id. In contrast, the Code of Judicial Conduct is concerned about the
role of the judge in the legal system, and the judge's ability to impact the system and society
by his behavior. The primary role of a judge is as a judicial officer; however, judges engage in
many quasi and extra-judicial activities that may affect the legal system and are worthy of
regulation. S. LUBET, supra note 1, at 4. See generally Sutton, A Comparison of the Code of
Professional Responsibility with the Code of Judicial Conduct, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 355.
18. The CJC was adopted by the ABA in 1972, and was later revised in 1984.
19. The judicial activities that CJC Canon 3 regulates are competence (Canon 3A( I)),
order and decorum (Canon 3A(2)), judicial demeanor (Canon 3A(3)), impartiality (Canons
3A(l), 3A(4), 3A(6), and 3A(7)), ex parte communications (Canon 3A(4)), and disqualification (Canon 3C). See MODEL CODE, supra note 4, Canon 3.
20. Id., Canon 4. Canon 4 regulates quasi-judicial activities such as academic pursuits
involving the legal system (Canon 4A), appearances before legislative and executive bodies
(Canon 4B), and involvement with governmental agencies (Canon 4C). Id.
21. Id., Canon 5. Canon 5 of the Code deals with extra-judicial activities such as avocational activities (Canon 5A), involvement with charities and civic organizations (Canon 5B),
business and financial dealings (Canon 5C, 5D), acceptance of gifts (Canon 5C(4)), and extrajudicial appointments (Canon 5G). Id.
22. See MODEL CODE, supra note 4. The CJC replaced the Canons in an effort to establish standards "which [are] realistic and enforceable yet responsive to the legitimate expectations of the public." See also Weckstein, Roundtable Discussions on the Proposed Code of
Judicial Conduct: Introductory Observations on the Code of Judicial Conduct, 9 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 785, 786 (1972).
23. ABA PROPOSED DRAFT, supra note 4, preamble. The text of the canons and the rule
sections are authoritative. The commentary is not intended as a statement of additional rules,
but provides guidance as to the meaning and application of the Canons and sections. Id.
24. S. LUBET, supra note I, at 4. The CJC has been adopted in full by 45 states and the
District of Columbia, and in part by the remaining 5 states. Id. Pennsylvania has adopted the
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B. Purpose of the Code of Judicial Conduct
Ethical codes such as the Code of Judicial Conduct serve both

proscriptive and prescriptive purposes.2 5 The proscriptive function is
legislative in nature, and sets forth definitions for acts of professional
misconduct that are legally punishable.2 6 In contrast, the prescriptive

function sets the standards to guide behavior and serves as a state-

ment of moral order.2 7 The Code of Judicial Conduct attempts to

address each of these purposes. The seven canons that comprise the
CJC are intended to be the "rules" of ethical behavior expected

from judicial officers.28 The canons are intended to establish standards that govern the ethical conduct of judges and to provide a
structure through which disciplinary agencies can regulate and en-

force proper conduct.29
Professional disciplinary action is neither criminal nor civil in
nature, and is not intended to be the basis for prosecution."0 The
proposed preamble to the final draft of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct (1990) indicates:
Whether disciplinary action is appropriate, and the degree
of discipline to be imposed, should be determined through a reasonable and reasoned application of the text and should depend
on such factors as the seriousness of the transgression, whether
there is a pattern of improper activity and the effect of the imCode of Judicial Conduct with minor modifications. See generally 204 PA. CODE § 33 (1979).
For a comprehensive history of the Code of Judicial Conduct, see generally E. THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1973); Thode, Roundtable Discussions on
the Proposed Code of Judicial Conduct: The Development of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 9
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 793 (1972); Weckstein, supra note 22.
25. Lubet, The Search for Analysis in Judicial Ethics or Easy Cases Don't Make
Much Law, 66 NEB. L. REV. 430, 433-34 (1987). The author stated that forcodes of conduct
to be effective, they must be "self-enforcing" and "able to provide their own answers to questions of interpretation." Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Not all commentators are in agreement
that the Code has accomplished this ideal. According to one author,
the judicial code of conduct remains a sparse and general document with consensus rules limited to fairly obvious and egregious behavior; the judicial opinions
enforcing the prohibitions are abrupt and conclusory with little analysis or recognition of the difficult trade offs involved; and the scholarship on judicial ethics is
minimal.
Perlman, Judicial Ethics: Searching for Consensus, 66 NEB. L. REV. 413, 414 (1987).
29. See MODEL CODE, supra note 4. The Code is not expected to be an exhaustive
guide. It is intended to be supplemented by general ethical standards, and to "'state basic
standards which should govern the conduct of all judges and to provide guidance to assist
judges in establishing and maintaining high standards of judicial and personal conduct." See
ABA PROPOSED DRAFT, supra note 4, at 2.
30. ABA PROPOSED DRAFT, supra note 4, preamble.
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proper activity on others or on the judicial system."1

The CJC is concerned not only with the actions of the violator, but
must also consider the effects such actions have on the public, profession, and courts.32 In response to concerns about judicial misconduct, many states instituted boards or commissions to investigate
such allegations.3 3 In Pennsylvania, for example, the Judicial Inquiry
and Review Board was established as an independent agency to consider judicial misconduct charges against judges, and to make appropriate disciplinary recommendations to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court."' ALJ's are not considered to be within the scope of the judi35
cial officers covered by the authority of the Board.

Bar association professional ethics committees have been established to give opinions on the Code of Judicial Conduct and professional responsibility issues.3 6 The ABA By-Laws assign the responsi31. Id. at 2.
32. See Sutton, supra note 17, at 360; S. LUBET, supra note I, at 5-6.
33. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978). As of 1978,
47 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had established by constitution, statute,
or court rule a judicial inquiry board or commission to handle disciplinary procedures. Id. at
834.
34. The Pennsylvania Judicial Inquiry and Review Board (JIRB) was established in
1968 with the adoption of Article V, § 18 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Pursuant to PA.
CONST. art. V, § 18(a) (1968):
There shall be a Judicial Inquiry and Review Board having nine members
as follows: three judges of the courts of common pleas from different judicial
districts and two judges of the Superior Court, all of whom shall be selected by
the Supreme Court; and two non-judge members of the bar of the Supreme
Court and two non-lawyer electors, all of whom shall be selected by the
Governor.
See also First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 501 Pa. 129, 460 A.2d
722 (1983).
Members of the board serve terms of four years. Upon receipt of complaints, the board
makes a preliminary investigation and may order a hearing. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(b) (1968).
If good cause is found, a disciplinary recommendation is made to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court. Id. at 18(g). The supreme court has the ultimate authority to reject the board's recommendation or modify the proposed discipline. Id. at 18(b). A veil of secrecy surrounds the
investigation and JIRB decision until it is submitted to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Liebier, Eye on the Judiciary: Update on the JIRB, PA. LAW., Dec. 1989, at 23.
35. The Rules of Procedure Governing the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board do not
define a "judge." Rule 1(a), however, expressly indicates:
Provided, where the judge is a justice of the peace, magistrate, alderman, or
other member of the minor judiciary (including any mentioned in the schedule
to Art. V, 12 and 21 of the Constitution of 1968) the Board may refer the
matter to the President Judge of the county where office is held for the purpose
of preliminary investigation with respect to which said President Judge shall
make a report to the Board.
Rules of Procedure Governing Judicial Inquiry and Review Board, 204 PA. CODE § 41 (1985).
See generally 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2101-2105, 3331-3334 (Purdon 1982).
36. See Martineau, supra note 16, at 412. The ABA and state bar associations have
ethics committees that consider and offer advisory opinions on questions of legal ethics. These
published opinions are advisory only and are not binding on any court or disciplinary authority. M. SCHWARTZ & R. WYDICK, PROBLEMS IN LEGAL ETHICS 11 (2d ed. 1988).

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES

bility of giving formal and informal opinions to the ABA Committee
on Professional Ethics. 37 Informal state professional ethics committees, such as the Pennsylvania Bar Association Committee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, are delegated the responsibility for
providing nonbinding advisory opinions at the state level .3a Both the
ABA and state ethics committees have informally applied the CJC
to ALJ's.39
C. Applicability of the CJC to Administrative Law Judges
A special compliance section of the Code of Judicial Conduct
sets forth the types of judicial officers that are explicitly governed by
the Code. 0 The compliance section following Canon 7 states, in pertinent part:
A. Anyone, whether or not a lawyer, who is an officer of a judicial system performing judicial functions, including an officer
such as a referee in bankruptcy,41 special master, 42 court commissioner43 or magistrate,4 4 is a judge for purposes of this
Code.4
37. See ABA BY-LAws art. X, § 7(l) (1970).
38. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Bar Association Comm. on Legal Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 89-86 (1989). All opinions are qualified as follows: "The foregoing
opinion is advisory only and is not binding on the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania or any court. It carries only such weight as an appropriate reviewing authority
may choose to give it."
39. See infra notes 153-95 and accompanying text.
40. MODEL CODE, supra note 4, Compliance with the Code of Judicial Conduct [hereinafter Compliance]. The Draft revision to the ABA Model Code changes the title from "compliance with" to "application of" in the interest of greater accuracy. See ABA PROPOSED
DRAFT, supra note 4 (Legislative Draft Format).
41. A referee is a "[pierson who is appointed to exercise judicial powers, to take testimony, to hear parties, and report his findings." Department of Motor Vehicles v. Superior
Court for Los Angeles County, 271 Cal. App. 2d 770, 774, 76 Cal. Rptr. 804, 806 (1969). He
is an officer exercising judicial powers, and is an arm of the court for a specific purpose. Id.;
Segal v. Jackson, 183 Misc. 460, 462, 48 N.Y.S.2d 877, 879 (1944) (citing In re Hathaway,
71 N.Y. 238, 243 (1877)) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1151 (5th ed. 1979)).
42. A special master is appointed to act as the representative of the court in some particular act or transaction. See Pewabic Mining Co. v. Mason, 145 U.S. 349 (1891).
43. A court commissioner is "[a] person appointed by a judge to take testimony and find
facts or to carry out some specific function connected with a case." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
319 (5th ed. 1979).
44. "In a general sense, a magistrate is a public officer, possessing such power, legislative, executive, or judicial, as the government appointing him may ordain, although in a narrow sense he is regarded -as an inferior judicial officer." See Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 250
So. 2d 4, 5 (Fla. 1971).
45. See MODEL CODE, supra note 4, Compliance. The proposed draft revision to the
ABA Model CJC modifies the officers covered by the compliance section to read:
Anyone, whether or not a lawyer, who is an officer of a judicial system and who
performs judicial functions, including an officer such as a magistrate, court commissioner, special master, or referee, is a judge within the meaning of this Code.
All judges shall comply with this Code except as provided below.
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Most state judges are subject to a version of the CJC; federal judges
are also covered by virtue of the 1973 Judicial Conference.46 In addition, the Code provides for limited compliance by retired judges,"7
part-time judges,' 8 and pro tempore part-time judges."9
Some state courts and ethics committees have applied the CJC
directly or by analogy to administrative law judges, even though the

CJC does not have direct applicability. 0 The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) 1 has indicated that the CJC may be an appropriate guide for evaluating the conduct of federal administrative law
judges. 2 For the most part, however, ALJ's are not uniformly held
to a standardized code of conduct. 5 3 The most commonly cited reason against such an application hinges on the constitutional status of
ALJ's as members of the executive branch of the government.' The
statutory language of the compliance section following Canon 7 does
not apply to ALJ's, for their executive status renders them nonjudi-

cial officers."6 Procedurally, decisions of ALJ's can be overturned by
agency officials. Critics believe that this reduces the need for a high
degree of surety in the impartiality and fairness of the ALJ's deciABA PROPOSED DRAFT, supra note 4 (Legislative Draft Format) (emphasis added).
The Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct substantially adopts the Model Code; however, it excepts from the compliance section justices of the peace, Pittsburgh police magistrates, and Philadelphia traffic court justices. See 204 PA. CODE § 33 (1979).
46. Levinson, The Proposed Administrative Law Judge Corps: An Incomplete But Important Reform Effort, 19 NEW ENG. L. REV. 733, 752 (1984).
47. MODEL CODE, supra note 4, Compliance (C).
48. Id., Compliance (A).
49. Id., Compliance (B).
50. See infra notes 153-87 and accompanying text.
51. The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) was established under Title II of the
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92
Stat. 1111, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 13, 1978). The MSPB is given adjudicative and enforcement powers over federal agencies and employees. See generally I J. STEIN, G. MITCHELL
& B. MEZINES, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 5.07(3)(b) (1988) (hereinafter J. STEIN].
52. In re Chocallo, 2 M.S.P.B. 23, 63-64, affd, 2 M.S.P.B. 20 (1980). "Though not
specifically made applicable to, or directly binding on, federal administrative law judges, the
code serves, nevertheless, as an appropriate guide for evaluating . . . [judicial] conduct." Id.
This reasoning was cited and applied in ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 86-1522 (1986).
53. ALJ's currently follow guidelines recommended by the Administrative Procedure
Act or Model State Administrative Procedure Act, or codes of conduct advanced by the employing agency.
54. See infra note 65 and accompanying text. In addition to executive agencies, there
are at least 63 independent agencies operating at the federal level, and many more at the state
level. Independent agencies are, in theory, free from executive influence. See I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.8, at 88 (2d ed. 1978). This Comment focuses exclusively on
executive agencies; however, the analysis is equally applicable to those considered to be
independent.
55. See MODEL CODE, supra note 4, Compliance. See also ABA PROPOSED DRAFT,
supra note 4, at 42 n.2.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES

sion.6 6 The assumption that the CJC can be applied unofficially has
also hindered the adoption of an official ethical conduct code for administrative law judges. 7
In May 1989, a subcommittee of the ABA Standing Committee

on Ethics and Professional Responsibility undertook a revision of the
Code of Judicial Conduct." A footnote to the proposed revision of
the compliance section clearly states that ALJ's are not governed by
the Code of Judicial Conduct, unless the Code is expressly adopted
by the jurisdiction or executive agency in which the ALJ functions. 9
Thus, the decision of whether to apply the CJC to ALJ's rests with

each state.
III.
A.

Administrative Law Judges
Historical Treatment
Federal and state government agencies employ administrative

law judges to conduct hearings and make initial administrative determinations." Powers and responsibilities are defined and delegated
to AL's in the Administrative Procedure Act,61 state administrative
acts, and in enabling statutes and procedural rules of the various
agencies. 2 The duties of ALJ's vary depending upon the type of
hearing and the nature of the agency conducting the proceeding. 63
Administrative law judges are commonly called the "hidden judici56. Jeon, First Conduct Code Adopted for Administrative Judges, LEGAL TIMES, Aug.
8, 1983 (Nexis, Nexis library, Wires file). It should be noted, however, that erroneous judicial
decisions may also be reversed by a reviewing authority.
57. A Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) ALJ indicated that administrative
law judges vetoed the establishment of their own code in 1982. He noted that ifstandards are
needed for ALJ's, the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct could be applied unofficially. Id.
58. See generally ABA PROPOSED DRAFT, supra note 4. This is the first total re-examination of the CJC since it was adopted in 1972. ABAIBNA Lawyers Manual on Professional
Conduct, Current Reports (May 10, 1989).
59. The footnote provides:
Applicability of this Code to administrative law judges should be determined by each adopting jurisdiction. Administrative law judges generally are
affiliated with the executive branch of government rather than the judicial
branch and each adopting jurisdiction should consider the unique characteristics
of particular administrative law judge positions in adopting and adapting the
Code foradministrative law judges.
ABA PROPOSED DRAFT, supra note 4, at 42 n.2.
60. See I J.STEIN, supra note 51, § 6.01.
61. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified at
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 3105, 3344, 6362, 7562 (1988)).
62. M. RUHLEN, MANUAL FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES 1 (1982).
63. See M. RICH & W. BRUCAR, supra note 8, at 10. For example, in worker's compensation and unemployment insurance agencies in which there is a great deal of litigation, ALJ's
are maintained on a full-time basis. In contrast, some smaller agencies will employ part-time
ALJ's when cases arise. Id.
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ary" by virtue of their impact, which far exceeds their public visibility. 64 Even though AL's often appear to function as part of the judicial branch, they are, in fact, integral components of the executive

branch.65 As such, the agency administrative law judge does not
maintain the independence or stature of the Article III or state level
judiciary because the executive branch has jurisdiction and control
over the AL's employment.6 6
Administrative hearings have occurred since 1789,7 although

the examiners employed by the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) in 1906 are considered to be the first administrative hearing
officers to have the title "examiner." 6 8 Initially, the hearing examiners were employed in strictly ministerial capacities to improve efficiency by gathering information for agency officials.6 9 Gradually, the
hearing examiners took a more active role in filing proposed reports
and making initial summaries and recommendations. 70 As greater
functional specialization became a concern of the agencies, the hearing examiners were delegated greater factfinding duties and in-

creased independence.7 1 The New Deal and its innovative economic
regulatory legislation further expanded the adjudicatory and investigatory roles of administrative agencies, and hence, the role of the

examiner.72
The 1930s saw the advent of several proposals to establish an
64. See Simon, supra note 6, at 1, col. 4. "But while their actions touch the lives of most
Americans, they have received only a fraction of the attention accorded federal district
judges-whom they outnumber more than 2-1." Id. See also M. RICH & W. BRUCAR, supra
note 8, at vii (noting that "state administrative law judges have remained a hidden judiciary");
Segal, The Administrative Law Judge: Thirty Years of Progress and the Road Ahead, 62
A.B.A. J. 1424, 1425 (1976).
65. The United States Constitution, Article II states that the President "shall take care
that the laws be faithfully executed" and mentions "executive departments" and "officers"
under the President who would administer the legislation adopted by Congress. U.S. CONST.
art. II. See D. BARRY & H. WHITCOMB, THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 53 (1981).

66. See Lussier, supra note 3, at 776. The author notes, however, that this lack of independence or stature does not alter the judicial nature of the adjudicatory function involved. Id.
67. 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 54, § 17.11, at 313. The first administrative hearing officers
may have been the officers who determined whether soldiers were disabled "during the late
war," or customs officials used to estimate duties. Subsequent administrative hearing officers
were inspectors of vessels who decided cases in 1838, and registers of the General Land Office
in 1840. Id.
68. Id.
69. Davis, Judicialization of Administrative Law: The Trial-Type Hearing and the
Changing Status of the Hearing Examiner, 1977 DUKE L. REV. 389, 392.
70. Id.
71. 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 54, § 17.11, at 313-14.
72. S. REIGAL & P. OWEN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-THE LAW OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 3 (1982). The New Deal Depression era agencies were conceived to regulate the entire
economy out of a depression. This produced a noticeable expansion in the size and scope of

government activities, primarily through newly created agencies. Id.
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administrative court of general jurisdiction. 3 Although none of these
proposals ever came to fruition, the widespread concern over the
combination of adjudicatory and prosecutorial functions led to a
greater separation of functions, at least for federal AL's, in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 7 " The APA was enacted in 1946
in response to increasing dissatisfaction with the administrative adju-

dicative process. 75 This signaled the beginning of the modern administrative hearing process.7" While the APA increased the status and
power of the federal hearing examiner only slightly, the role of the
examiner has become increasingly judicialized so as to make the administrative process more closely resemble general jurisdiction
courts.

77

Concurrent with this judicialization process, courts began to expand the scope of individual interests that require an administrative
hearing before being affected.7 8 The fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution provides that procedural due process protections must be extended prior to the deprivation of certain property
interests.7 9 This has been judicially interpreted to mean that notice
and an opportunity for a hearing must accompany certain administrative actions. 80 The changing nature of government responsibilities,
coupled with the judicial imposition of hearing requirements, has necessitated an expansion of government agencies and AL's to ade73.

For a thorough discussion of past and present administrative court proposals, see E.

THOMAS, supra note 2, at 18-25; deSeife, Administrative Law Reform: A Focus on the Administrative Law Judge, 13 VAL. U.L. REV. 229 (1979).
74. E. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 18-21.

75. Id. at 20-21.
76. Id. at 1.
77. 3 K. DAvis, supra note 54, § 17.11, at 315-16. See also M. RiCH & W. BRUCAR,
supra note 8, at I. Judicialization of the administrative process encompasses the idea that
certain types of governmental actions cannot be sustained unless the agency has extended. the
adversely affected party procedural protection, such as notice and an opportunity to be heard.
As the spectrum of protected individual interests has expanded, agency adjudications have
become increasingly judicialized to meet due process standards. See Davis, supra note 69, at
391.
78. The expansion of rights has permeated into almost all socio-economic areas. See,
e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (public high school student may not be dismissed or
suspended without first being given oral or written notice and an opportunity to rebut the
evidence); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of governmental welfare benefits require prior notice and an opportunity for an administrative hearing): See also Davis,
supra note 69, at 391.
79. The fourteenth amendment states in relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
80. See Davis, supra note 69, at 391.
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quately meet the increased demand for agency hearings.8" Thus, the
modern hearing process is mandated to incorporate essential elements of the judicial model.8" The change in title from "hearing ex-

aminer" to "administrative law judge," implemented by the Civil
Service Commission in 1972, adequately reflects the current role of
the ALJ.83 This change emphasizes that the role of the ALJ is not
solely to hear or examine, but also to judge." '
1. Federal Administrative Law Judges.-Federal AL's are

created by and governed under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). 8" The APA attempts to separate AL's from their agencies
to increase the level of judicial independence.8 This is accomplished
in Title 5 of the United States Code, which statutorily provides for
security in tenure, promotion, and compensation.8 7 The relevant
APA provisions provide for civil service merit appointments8 8 for
AL's by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), 89 compensa81.
82.
83.

M. RICH & W. BRUCAR, supra note 8, at 8.
See Davis, supra note 69, at 391.
5 C.F.R. § 930.203(a) (1977), Pub. L. No. 95-251, 92 Stat. 183 (amending 5 U.S.C.

§ 3105).
84.
85.
86.
engaged
advising
87.
88.

Segal, supra note 64, at 1425.
See supra note 61.
5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1988). Internal separation of functions prohibits an employee
in the performance of investigative or prosecutorial functions from participating or
in the ultimate decision. Id.
5 U.S.C. §§ 5372, 7521 (1988). See also E. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 3.
5 U.S.C. § 3105 (1988), provides:
Each agency shall appoint as many administrative law judges as are necessary for proceedings to be conducted in accordance with sections 556 and 557 of
this title. Administrative law judges shall be assigned to cases in rotation so far
as practicable, and may not perform duties inconsistent with their duties and
responsibilities as administrative law judges.
Federal AL's are appointed through a professional merit selection system. AL's tend to
come from government service, often from the agency over whose hearings they preside. Candidates must be members of a bar, and have at least seven years experience, including two
years with an agency. See C. KOCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.4 (1985). A
candidate is subjected to examinations and interviews by the Omce of Personnel Management.
Those candidates meeting all requirements are certified and their names are placed on a register, which is supplied to agencies upon request. The agencies must select their ALJ's from the
register, but may impose their own further qualifications as conditions for appointment. (For
example, a set number of years of practice in the field of administrative law or an expertise in
a particular area). Id.
As a result of this selective service, many agencies hire former staff attorneys to fill ALJ
positions. This practice has been severely criticized by many as creating an "unhealthy appearance of institutional bias." See Davis, supra note 69, at 403. As Bernard Segal noted,
The permanent assignment of an administrative law judge to a single
agency also tends to produce an inbreeding, which in turn contributes even more
to the appearance of bias. For example, of the thirteen administrative law judges
assigned to the Federal Trade Commission, twelve are former employees of that
Commission . ...
Segal, supra note 64, at 1426.
89. The OPM is a governmental body separate from the employing agency. The OPM
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tion without regard for ratings or recommendations,90 and discharge
only upon a showing of "good cause" and a hearing before the Merit
Systems Protection Board.9 1 The federal approach officially makes
the ALJ an employee of a particular agency, but provides a career
appointment and an internal separation of the prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions.92

The APA provides that administrative law judges must preside
over all formal and informal trial-type proceedings, unless the
agency or an appointed member presides in lieu of the ALJ.93 AL's,
in practice, preside at most proceedings and make the initial or recommended decision, which is then reviewed by the agency.9 4 Agency

decisions are ultimately reviewable by the courts. 95
handles ALJ recruitment and qualifications. See generally I J. STEIN, supra note 51, §
5.07(3)(a).
90. 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (1988): "Administrative law judges appointed under section 3105 of
this title are entitled to pay prescribed by the Office of Personnel Management independently
of agency recommendations and ratings ....
"
91. 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (1988). This provision provides:
(a) An action may be taken against an administrative law judge appointed
under section 3105 of this title by the agency in which the administrative law
judge is employed only for good cause established and determined by the Merit
Systems Protection Board on the record after opportunity for hearing before the
Board.
(b) The actions covered by this section are(I) a removal;
(2) a suspension;
(3) a reduction in grade;
(4) a reduction in pay; and
(5) a furlough of 30 days or less;
but do not include(A) a suspension or removal under section 7532 of this title;
(B) a reduction-in-force action under section 3502 of this title; or
(C) any action initiated under section 1206 of this title.
For a comprehensive discussion of "good cause" removal, see Rosenblum, Contexts and Contents of "For Good Cause" as Criterion For Removal of Administrative Law Judges: Legal
and Policy Factors, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 593 (1984).
92. M. RICH & W. BRUCAR, supra note 8, at 2. See also E. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 3,
20.
93. 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (1988):
There shall preside at the taking of evidence(I) the agency;
(2) one or more members of the body which comprises the agency;
or
(3) one or more administrative law judges appointed under section
3105 of this title.
94. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (1988). The agency is free to substitute its judgment for that of
the AL. See infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
95. The Administrative Procedure Act provides for judicial review of "[a]gency action
made reviewable by statute and final agency action ....
" 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988). Review has
been held to be appropriate when the agency action is final, binding on the parties involved,
and has injured an affected party. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988). See generally 5 J. STEIN,
supra note 51, § 43.01.
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2. State Administrative Law Judges.-Little attention has
been paid to state administrative agencies and AL's as compared to
their federal counterparts.9" This lack of attention does not reflect
that AL's are used more frequently by state administrative agencies
than by federal agencies. 97 Despite this widespread use, develop-

ments at the state level have generally been inconsistent and have
not adopted the advancements made at the federal level. 8 The most
fundamental differences between a federal agency and a state
agency is in size and organization; state agencies are often smaller

and more loosely organized than their federal counterparts.99 Although smaller size provides for a more intimate agency environment, it also may lead to delicate questions concerning possible favoritism or bias. 100
The most common approach adopted by the states is an agency
staff system.'0 1 This model is similar to the federal approach because, under both approaches, the ALJ bears more of a resemblance
to an agency employee than to a judicial officer.102 Agencies delegate
authority to the ALJ, and exercise ultimate supervision and control
over ALJ activity.1 03 Often, the hearing officer remains a functionary
of the employing agency, reflecting a ministerial conception of the
AL's function.1 04 The agency controls hiring, firing, and disciplining
AL's.1 0 5 Many states have adopted legislation governing adminis96. M. RICH & W. BRUCAR, supra note 8, at 9.
97. Id.
98. Id. "[M]any state statutes continue to reflect the early view of the presiding officer
as a functionary." Davis, supra note 69, at 393.
99. See I F. COOPER, supra note 8, at 2.
100. Id.
101. M. RICH & W. BRUCAR, supra note 8, at 9.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., I PA. CODE § 35.185-.189 (1988).
104. See Davis, supra note 69, at 392. See also M. RICH & W BRUCAR, supra note 8,
at 2.
105. Id. See, e.g., 1 PA. CODE § 35.186 (1988):
A presiding officer may withdraw from a proceeding when he deems himself
disqualified, or he may be withdrawn by the agency head for good cause found
after timely affidavits alleging personal bias or other disqualification have been
filed and the matter has been heard by the agency head or by another presiding
officer to whom the agency head has delegated the matter for investigation and
report.
See also I PA. CODE § 35.188 (1988):
(a) Presiding officers may perform no duties inconsistent with their duties
and responsibilities as such.
(b) Save to the extent required for the disposition of ex parte matters as
authorized by law and by the regulations of the agency, no presiding officer
shall, in a proceeding which the agency head has directed be conducted under
this subsection, consult a person or party on a fact in issue unless upon notice
and opportunity for participants to participate.
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trative procedures based upon the Model State Administrative Procedure Act. 10 6 Due to variations between state agencies and procedures, the duties of administrative law judges vary from state to
10 7
state, and from agency to agency.
A novel approach adopted by ten states to address the issue of
increasing ALJ independence is the central panel system. 0 8 Under
this approach, an independent, managing agency is created to con-

duct administrative hearings. 0 9 Central panel systems increase the
"judicialization" of the administrative process. " 0 By separating
AL's from their agencies, this system serves to make the adjudicatory process appear more objective. "1 ' The managing agency assigns
AL's to preside over hearings upon the request of an agency, which
allows an ALJ to serve numerous agencies instead of a specific
one. " 2 ALJ decisions remain subject to agency adoption;"' however,

the increased independence from a specific agency is thought to improve the fairness of the decision." 4 The success of this state central
panel system has encouraged other states to investigate such a system." 5 Implementation of a comparable system at the federal level
continues to generate much debate and discussion. "'
106. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, 14 U.L.A. 357 (Master ed.
1981) [hereinafter MODEL STATE APA]. The Model Act was adopted in 1946 by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. It was designed to serve as a guide to
the states, and, as of 1989, 29 states have adopted its provisions. The Model Act provides for
disqualification of an ALJ for bias, prohibits certain ex parte communications, requires ALJ
decisions to be supported by an accompanying record, and confers powers upon ALJ's for the
conduct of hearings. See M. RICH & W. BRUCAR, supra note 8, at 10-1I1.
107. M. RICH & W. BRUCAR, supra note 8, at 10.
108. See E. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 10-1I1. The 10 states that have adopted the central
panel system for administrative adjudication are: California, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11370,
11502 (Deering 1982); Colorado, COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-30-1001 (1982); Florida, FLA. STAT.
§ 120.65 (1983); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 7, § 4 H (Law. Co-op. 1984); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.052 (West Supp. 1984); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 621.015
(Vernon Supp. 1987); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14 F (West Supp. 1984-85); North
Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150 B-23 (Interim Supp. 1986); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. §
4-5-120 (Supp. 1984); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 34.12 (1983). See also Harves, The
1981 Model State Administrative Procedure Act: The Impact on Central Panel States, 6 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 661 (1984).
109. M. RICH & W. BRUCAR, supra note 8, at vii.
110. Id.
III. Id. For an overview of the central panel system, see Harves, supra note 108; Rich,
The Central Panel System and the Decisionmaking Independence of Administrative Law
Judges: Lessons for a Proposed Federal Program, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 643 (1984).
112. M. RICH & W. BRUCAR, supra note 8, at 14.
113. Id. at 11.
114. Id. at 14.
115. Sixteen other states have indicated an interest in implementing central panel systems: Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Nebraska, New
York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Virginia, and Wyoming. See
E. THOMAS, supra note 2, at I I n.38.
116. Id. For a discussion of the Heflin bill and other federal proposals, see E. THOMAS,
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Comparability to Judges

1. Similarities in Role.-Like their judicial counterparts, presiding AL's have an affirmative duty to be impartial decisionmakers. In formal, trial-type hearings, the ALJ serves as the pre-

siding officer and has broad adjudicatory powers to make initial or
recommended agency decisions. 117 In such a hearing, the AL's duties are similar to those of a trial judge; however, the AL's ruling is
more a recommendation than a final decision." 8 Although ALJ rulings are recommendations subject to review, most rulings are given

considerable weight by the agency and become final agency decisions." 9 Since the presiding ALJ controls discovery, the admissibility
of evidence, and the conduct of the hearing, he directly affects the
record upon which the ultimate agency decision will be based. 2 '
The actual duties performed by federal and state AL's demon2
strate their resemblance to trial judges:' 1
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: THE CORPS ISSUE (1987); Joost, A Corps of Federal Administrative Law Judges: Why? What Kind? Operating How? Under Whose Control?, 19 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 695 (1984); Levant, A Unified Corps of Administrative Law Judges-The Transition from a Concept to an Eventual Reality, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 705 (1984); Levinson,
The Proposed Administrative Law Judge Corps: An Incomplete But Important Reform Effort, 19 NEW ENG. L. REV. 733 (1984); Palmer & Bernstein, Establishing Federal Administrative Law Judges as an Independent Corps: The Heflin-Bill, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 673
(1984); cf. Zankel, A Unified Corps of Administrative Law Judges is Not Needed, 6 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 723 (1984).
117. See I J.STEIN, supra note 51, § 6.01. An initial decision becomes the final agency
action unless it is reviewed by an appeal board or agency head. A recommended decision must
be considered and acted upon by agency leadership before it can take effect. Id.
118. See 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 54, § 17.11, at 315. Proposals have been advanced to
increase ALJ power to make it comparable to that of a district court judge. There is an inherent limitation, however, in the Administrative Procedure Act. APA § 557(b) provides in relevant part: "on appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers
which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or
by rule." 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (1988).
Various statutes and regulations delegate similar powers of review to the respective agencies. See I J. STEIN, supra note 51, § 6.01.
119. M. RICH & W. BRUCAR, supra note 8, at 1-2. Although ALJ rulings are reviewed
by the agency and may be overturned, in reality most become the final agency decision. Id.
The ALJ has elicited the facts, weighed the evidence, and assessed witness credibility; agency
reviewers are dependent solely upon the factual record developed by the ALJ at the proceeding. Id.
120. Lussier, supra note 3.
121. 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (1988) lists the powers of presiding officers:
(c) Subject to published rules of the agency and within its powers, employees presiding at hearings may(1)administer oaths and affirmations;
(2) issue subpoenas authorized by law;
(3) rule upon offers of proof and receive relevant evidence;
(4) take depositions or have depositions taken when the ends of justice would be served;
(5) regulate the course of the hearing;
(6) hold conferences for the settlement or simplification of the issues
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Like the district court judge in a nonjury trial, administrative
law judges are largely finders of fact. They are not "special masters," advisers, or counsellors. Their function is to judge, after
hearing counsel and the testimony and doing the necessary analyzing, weighing, and studying, case by case, issue by issue.'
The administrative hearing, like a judicial action, emphasizes legal
representation and the use of procedural and evidentiary rules.12 3
ALJ's often have special expertise in the area they serve, and thus

are often given a greater role than a trial judge in developing law
and policy. 24 AL's may issue subpoenas and orders requiring answers to questions, compel admissions, rule on admissibility of evidence, regulate the course of the hearing, hold conferences for settle-

ment, rule on motions, and file initial decisions.' 25 Although ALJ's
do not hold contempt powers, they do have the power to suspend or

bar an attorney from participation in a particular proceeding for disby consent of the parties;
(7) dispose of procedural requests or similar matters;
(8) make or recommend decisions in accordance with section 557 of
this title; and
(9) take other action authorized by agency rule consistent with this
subchapter.
Cf I PA. CODE § 35.187 (1988), which provides:
Presiding officers designated by the agency head to preside at hearings shall
have the authority, within the powers and subject to the regulations of the
agency, as follows:
(1) To regulate the course of the hearings, including the scheduling
thereof, subject to the approval of the agency head, and the recessing,
reconvening, and adjournment thereof, unless otherwise provided by the
agency head, as provided in 35.102(b) (relating to hearing calendar).
(2) To administer oaths and affirmations.
(3) To issue subpoenas.
(4) To rule upon offers of proof and receive evidence.
(5) To take or cause depositions to be taken.
(6) To hold appropriate conferences before or during hearings.
(7) To dispose of procedural matters but not, before their proposed
report, if any, to dispose of motions made during hearings to dismiss proceedings or other motions which involve final determination of
proceedings.
(8) Within their discretion, or upon direction of the agency head, to
certify any question to the agency head for consideration and disposition
by the agency head.
(9) To submit their proposed reports in accordance with 35.202 (relating to proceedings in which proposed reports are prepared).
(10) To take other action necessary or appropriate to the discharge
of duties vested in them, consistent with the statutory or other authorities
under which the agency functions and with the regulations and policies of
the agency.
122. Segal, supra note 64, at 1425.
123. Rich, supra note 11l, at 643 n.2.
124. C. KOCH, supra note 88, § 6.5.
125. E. ROCKEFELLER, DESK BOOK OF FTC PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 118-19 (3d ed.
1979).
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orderly conduct. 26
The last decade has seen noticeable trends toward upgrading
qualifications for AL's, making them more "judicialized" in all of
their functions.1 27 Administrative law judges are increasingly perceived as comparable in function to trial judges since the Supreme
Court recognized the judicial nature of the ALJ role.' 28 In Butz v.
Economou, 12 9 the Supreme Court held that federal AL's were entitled to the same absolute immunity as judges. The Court recognized
that the administrative adjudicatory process "shares enough of the
characteristics of the judicial process" that absolute judicial immunity should apply to ALl's. 3 Absolute immunity has been further
extended to encompass state quasi-judicial and inferior judicial
officers.''
AL's tend to think of themselves as judges, or "comparable to
judges," as evidenced by the title "administrative law judge" and by
their Federal Trial Examiners Conference. 3 2 Lawyers practicing in
both the courts and in agency proceedings have indicated that there
are no significant differences between the two forums. 3 3 When engaged in formal adjudication, the administrative forum is conducting
a proceeding as equally judicial as that of an Article III court. 3 4
Thus, despite the differences in adjudicative form, the administrative
126. Id.
127. Davis, supra note 69, at 407. See supra note 77. See also NLRB v. Permanent
Label Corp., 657 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1981) (court enforced an order of the NLRB based upon
ALJ statement of reasons justifying choice of bargaining order over ordering of new elections).
128. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978).
129. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
130. Id. at 513.
The conflicts which federal hearing examiners seek to resolve are every bit as
fractious as those which come to court . . . . Moreover, federal administrative

law requires that agency adjudication contain many of the same safeguards as
are available in the judicial process. The proceedings are adversary in nature
There can be little doubt that the role of the modern hearing examiner or
administrative law judge within this framework is "functionally comparable" to
that of a judge. His powers are often, if not generally, comparable to those of a
trial judge ....
Id.
131. See Petition of Dwyer, 486 Pa. 585, 406 A.2d 1355 (1979) (court adopted principle
of quasi-judicial immunity for agency officials); Myers v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Labor &
Indus., 312 Pa. Super. 61, 458 A.2d 235 (1983) (worker's compensation referee granted absolute immunity in civil damage action because "[hie is, in short, the trial judge of the worker's
compensation system").
132. Pops, Judicialization of Federal Administrative Law Judges: Implications for
Policymaking, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 169, 197 (1979).
133. E. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 2.
134. Timony, Disciplinary Proceedings Against Federal Administrative Law Judges, 6
W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 807, 810 n.20 (1984) (citing L. MAYERS, THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEm 417-21 (rev. ed. 1964)).
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hearing and presiding ALJ should be given the same deference as a
trial judge.
2. Differences in Role.-Although ALJ's may resemble judges
in many of their functions, there are essential differences that preclude a finding of bona fide judicial status. Constitutionally, federal
AL's are considered agency employees under the executive branch
of government. 13 5 Executive status distinguishes ALJ's from actual
judges. Additionally, ALJ power is still subordinate to that of the
agency, despite APA language that makes ALJ initial decisions final
unless there is further agency action.' 86 Since the initial decision is
only a recommendation that can be replaced, it does not reach the
independent level of judicial decisionmaking. "" Thus, the decision of
an ALJ, even though reached after a hearing resembling a trial and
consisting of many judicial procedures, may still be rejected or modified by the agency.' 38
In contrast to the judiciary, agencies have a statutory goal and
AL's must develop the facts at a hearing in order to carry out that
mandate. Thus, the proceeding may be largely "inquisitorial," with
the ALJ taking a more active role in questioning witnesses and elic39
iting relevant facts, rather than a pure adversarial contest.1 Similarly, AL's have a greater affirmative responsibility than a trial
judge to assure that a full and accurate record is developed at the
hearing. 4 0
The punishments that AL's may impose are more limited than
those available to judicial officers. Administrative agencies may not
constitutionally impose imprisonment as a penalty for violation of a
statute or regulation.14 ' Similarly, the guarantee of a trial by jury
42
bars the consideration of felony cases by administrative agencies.'
135. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
136. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (1988).
137. See 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 54, § 17.11, at 316.
But the power of district judges is considerably greater, for their decisions are
final except in the few cases that are appealed, and review of their findings is
governed by the "clearly erroneous" test, whereas ALJs' decisions are typically
in the nature of recommendations (even when they are called "initial decisions"), because 556(b) of the APA provides that in reviewing an initial decision
of an ALJ "the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the
initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule.
Id.
138. Davis, supra note 69, at 406-07.
139. See 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 54, § 17.13, at 319.
140. C. KOCH, supra note 88, § 6.5.
141. S. REIGAL & P. OWEN, supra note 72, at 17.
142. Id.
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The Supreme Court, in Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners
Cdnference,4 3 found that Congress intended AL's to be only "a
special class of semi-independent subordinate hearing officers"
within the federal administrative system, and not the equivalent of
judges.""' Agency control over ALJ decisions, conduct, and schedules
seems to confirm this intent. The hierarchy of power can subject

AL's to a variety of pressures and influence not experienced by the
Article III judiciary. 1" The existence of such pressures makes the
need for additional controls over AL's all the more obvious.
IV.
A.

Current Regulation of ALJ Conduct
Statutory Guidelines

Administrative law judges, as lawyers, are subject to the canons
of ethics of the bar. 46 Additional standards are set forth by the federal government, 4 7 and by the employing agencies. 148 Although

Congress did not incorporate ethical standards for ALJ's into the
Administrative Procedure Act, the APA and the Model State APA
do provide some general guidelines to AL's regarding ex parte com-

munications, 14 and disqualification for bias or impartiality. 50 The
legislative history of the APA confirms the intent to monitor official
ALJ conduct. 15 ' Violations of these guidelines are actionable only if
143. 345 U.S. 128, rehg denied, 345 U.S. 931 (1953).
144. Id. at 130. The three dissenting justices indicated that they believed Congress intended ALJ's to be "very nearly the equivalent of judges even though operating within the
Federal System of administrative justice." Id. at 144 (Black, Douglas, Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting S. Doc. No. 82, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1946)).
145. E. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 5-6.
146. Many states apply the Model Code of Professional Responsibility or the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct to quasi-judicial officers instead of the Code of Judicial Conduct. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1981); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983). The CJC and the professional responsibility codes attempt to
solve many of the same ethical questions. In some instances, there is a direct interrelationship
between the two codes; they are complementary in coverage and have only minor divergences.
See generally Sutton, supra note 17.
147. 5 C.F.R. 735 (1981).
148. M. RUHLEN, supra note 62, at 70.
149. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (1988); MODEL STATE APA, supra note 106, § 14; 1 PA. CODE §
35.188 (1988).
150. 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (1988) provides in pertinent part:
The functions of presiding employees and of employees participating in decisions
in accordance with section 557 of this title shall be conducted in an impartial
manner. A presiding or participating employee may at any time disqualify himself. On the filing in good faith of a timely and sufficient affidavit of personal
bias or other disqualification of a presiding or participating employee, the agency
shall determine the matter as a part of the record and decision in the case.
See also I PA. CODE § 35.189 (1988).
151.
Those who . . . preside . . . must conduct the hearing in a strictly impar-
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"good cause" for removal can be shown.' 52 Additionally, any individual agency regulations regarding official conduct must be rigorously
observed.
B. Applicability of the Code of Judicial Conduct to Administrative Law Judges
1. The Federal Context.-The American

Bar Association

Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility has applied the
Canons of Judicial Ethics' 5" and the Code of Judicial Conduct to
federal ALJ's by analogy.154 In an informal opinion, the Committee
indicated that in some cases a hearing officer or member of a quasijudicial body would be subject to the Canons of Judicial Ethics. 55

This implication was expanded in a later opinion, which recommended that a federal ALJ may not represent another ALJ as counsel in a disciplinary proceeding.' 5 The Committee applied the reasoning of a Merit Systems Protection Board opinion 57 in analogizing

the use of the CJC. 58 Noting that although the CJC is not specifically applicable in this context, the Committee agreed that it is an
appropriate guide for evaluating ALJ conduct. 50 Accordingly, the
tial and considerate manner, rather than as representatives of an investigative or
prosecuting authority. They may make sure that all necessary evidence is adduced and keep the hearing orderly and efficient. No examiner may proceed in
willful disregard of law. Presiding officers must conduct themselves in accord
with the requirements of this bill and with due regard for the rights of all parties
as well as the facts, the law, and the need for prompt and orderly dispatch of
public business.
REPORT OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY ON S. 7, H.R. REP. No. 1980, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 268
(1946).
152. 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (1988). The "good cause" standard for removal is considered to be
not as strict as the "good behavior" criteria imposed upon federal judges. See Rosenblum,
supra note 91.
153. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. C-449
(1961).
154. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 86-1522
(1986); In re Chocallo, 2 M.S.P.B. 23, affid, 2 M.S.P.B. 20 (1980).
155. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. C-449
(1961). This opinion dealt with a situation in which a lawyer was to appear before an administrative board of which his spouse was a member. The Committee noted that the Canons of
Judicial Conduct make it clear that a judge should at all times avoid the appearance or suspicion of impropriety. The opinion provided that the spouse should consider disqualification in
such a situation.
156. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 86-1522
(1986).
157. In re Chocallo, 2 M.S.P.B. 23, af'd, 2 M.S.P.B. 20 (1980) (The Civil Service
Commission investigated allegations of ALJ misconduct, and determined that good cause existed for disciplinary action to be taken against the ALJ.).
158. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 86-1522
(1986).
159. Id. See also In re Chocallo, 2 M.S.P.B. 23, 63-64, aft'd, 2 M.S.P.B. 20 (1980).
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Committee reasoned that a federal ALJ is a "judge" and "an officer

of a judicial system performing judicial functions" for purposes of
the CJC, even though such judges are employees of a federal

agency.160
2.

The State Context.-If the CJC is applicable by analogy to

ALJ's in the federal context, then it should be equally applicable to

state ALJ's. Such an analogy was defeated in a footnote to an ABA
informal opinion, which indicated that the applicability of the CJC
provisions to state ALJ's depends upon the facts of the particular
case and the applicable law and judicial code in effect in that jurisdiction. 161 The uncertainty that prevails in this area is further evidenced by state ethics opinions that have attempted to address this
ambiguity. 62
(a) Directly applying the CJC to ALJ's.-States that have directly applied the Code of Judicial Conduct (CJC) to ALJ's have
done so through a logical expansion of the language in the CJC compliance section and an interpretation of what constitutes "an officer
of a judicial system performing judicial functions. 11 3 The states that
directly apply the CJC advocate that the term "judge" or "judicial

officer" be broadly construed.
The Pennsylvania Bar Association (PBA) Committee on Legal

Ethics and Professional Responsibility has applied the CJC directly
to part-time domestic relations special masters and hearing officers
in conjunction with the applicable provisions of the Pennsylvania
160.
(1986).
161.

ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 86-1522

Though not specifically within the scope of the inquiry, it should be pointed
out that the applicability of the provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct to
state administrative law judges depends upon the facts of the particular case and
the applicable law and judicial code in the jurisdiction in which it arises.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 86-1522 (1986).
162. See infra notes 163-95. Due to the variations in state administrative law, agency
procedures, and judicial codes, it is difficult to generalize about how states have handled ALJ
conduct inquiries. Differences between officers classified as "hearing examiners," "referees," or
"special masters" generally are not substantive and refer to quasi-judicial officers comparable
to ALJ's.
163. See MODEL CODE, supra note 4, Compliance. See, e.g., PBA Comm. on Legal
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 89-86 (1989); PBA Comm. on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Inquiry No. 88-22 (1988); PBA Comm. on Legal Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, Inquiry No. 88-250 (1988); Philadelphia Bar Association Professional Guidance Comm., Op. 87-20 (1987); Ohio State Bar Association Comm. on Legal
Ethics and Professional Conduct, Formal Op. 34 (1981). Cf. Michigan Comm. on Professional
and Judicial Ethics, Op. CI-633 (1981); Michigan Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics,
Op. CI-351 (1978).
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Rules of Professional Conduct.'" Accordingly, a special master appointed in connection with the dissolution of a two-lawyer firm was
held subject to the CJC through the provisions requiring special
masters to comply with the Code when performing "judicial functions. ' More recently, the PBA Ethics Committee indicated that
in the absence of any other ethical provisions regulating their conduct, workers' compensation referees should be governed by the
CJC.'6 1 The Committee noted that the issue is far from clear but
indicated its preference for applying the CJC to quasi-judicial officers, and concluded that the CJC should govern the conduct of
workers' compensation referees. 6 7 Pennsylvania has also accepted

the CJC as applicable authority to govern the removal of a Nuclear
Regulatory ALJ who demonstrated a strong appearance of bias. 6 '

Other states have also directly applied provisions of the Code of
Judicial Conduct to quasi-judicial officers. The Ohio State Bar Association applied the CJC directly to full-time referees, reasoning that
"a referee is an officer of a judicial system performing judicial functions within the meaning of the Compliance Section of the Code of
Judicial Conduct."' 6 9 The Committee supported its reasoning by ex-

amining the role of the referee: "a referee, in the trial before him,
acts as and takes the place of the court appointing him, and he possesses substantially all the authority of such court, with the excep164. PBA Comm. on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 88-138
(1988). The Committee indicated that a joint reading of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the
Rules of Professional Conduct requires that those serving as hearing examiners be beyond
suspicion in order to maintain public confidence in the impartiality and independence of the
judicial system. Id. The Committee concluded that lawyers serving as special masters should
be disqualified from representing individuals before that court. Id.
165. PBA Comm. on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 88-250
(1988). "Initially, since the inquirer is not serving as a lawyer but as a judicial officer, the
appropriate source of the ethical propriety of these actions is more properly found in the Code
of Judicial Conduct." Id. Thus, pursuant to Canon 3(C)(1), a special master should disqualify
himself in proceedings in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Id.
166. See PBA Comm. on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 8986 (1989). The opinion stated that a lawyer who is both a workers' compensation referee and a
part-time lawyer may not accept a client referral from a lawyer who will appear before him at
workers' compensation hearings. Id.
167. Id.
168. U.P.I.,
Jan. II, 1985 (Nexis, Nexis library, Wires file). The Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania filed a motion to remove a Nuclear Regulatory ALJ for demonstrating a strong
appearance of bias. In doing so, the Commonwealth noted that the ALJ's conduct "likely
violates the American Bar Association's Code of Judicial Conduct." Id.
169. Ohio State Bar Association Comm. on Legal Ethics and Professional Conduct, Formal Op. 34 (1981). The Commission was of the opinion that full-time referees are "judges"
for purposes of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and should comply with Canon 5(F), which
precludes judges from practicing law. A part-time referee. is considered to be a "part-time
judge" under the CJC, and should comply with all provisions except those noted in section
A(l)(2) of the Compliance section. Id.
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tions of the powers of rendering judgments and issuing executions."' 70 Additionally, the New York State Bar Association stated
that a member of the Administrative Appeals Board of the State

Motor Vehicle Department is subject to the same restrictions imposed upon judges.17 ' Similarly, an attorney serving as a hearing officer in proceedings to review small claim property tax assessments
has also been held to the same conduct as a judge. 7
(b) Applying the CJC to ALJ's by analogy.-More often than

direct application, the CJC is applied by analogy to encompass officers not listed in the CJC but who perform similar quasi-judicial
functions. The Pennsylvania Bar Association Ethics Committee, for
example, applied the CJC by analogy to Public Utility Commission
(PUC) ALJ's,7 a and to masters in divorce proceedings. 7 4 In applying the CJC to PUC administrative law judges, the PBA Ethics

Committee noted that Canon 3(C)(1)(d) may require disqualification of an ALJ if his impartiality might be questioned.

75

Applica-

tion of the Code was by analogy.because, under a prior Pennsylvania
176
decision, ALJ's may not be included in the category of judges.
Similarly, the Philadelphia Bar Association Professional Guidance
Committee held that a lawyer may not serve as a member of the

Worker's Compensation Appeal Board if his law firm represents clients before the board, since the quasi-judicial functions he performs
may require compliance with the CJC. 77 The dual obligations
170. Id.
171. New York State Bar Association Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 365 (1974).
The Committee further held that neither the lawyer nor other lawyers in his firm could represent private clients at a hearing conducted by a motor vehicle referee. Id.
172. New York State Bar Association Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 543 (1982).
"Even if such decisions are to possess no precedential value, the integrity and impartiality of
the assessment review procedures should not be clouded by such dual role inconsistencies." Id.
173. PBA Comm. on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 88-22
(1988). The opinion applied CJC Canon 3(c)(1)(d) by analogy because ALJ's are not included
in the category of judges. It should be noted, however, that Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission AL's are governed by their own code of conduct. See 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 319
(Purdon 1978).
174. PBA Comm. on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 80-47
(1980). A master in divorce proceedings is forbidden to represent one of the parties in later
litigation involving visitation rights. "When an attorney was acting as a master, he or she was
acting as the judge in the case for all practical purposes." Id.
175. PBA Comm. on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 88-22
(1988).
176. Id.
177. Philadelphia Bar Association Professional Guidance Comm., Op. 87-20 (1987).
The CJC prohibits the lawyer or judge from associating himself with other lawyers likely to
appear before him and from entering into financial or business dealings that may tend to
reflect adversely on his impartiality. Such an association may also interfere with the performance of the judge's judicial duties. See MODEL CODE, supra note 4, Canons 2, 3.
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presented conflict with the requirement that he perform his judicial
duties impartially." 8
The Arizona Ethics Committee addressed the propriety of ex
parte communications between an administrative law judge and a
lawyer appearing before him. 179 The Committee noted that although
judicial ethics was outside the scope of its opinion, Canon 3(A)(4) of
the CJC would prohibit a "judge" from initiating or considering ex
parte communications concerning a pending proceeding. 80 A subsequent Arizona Ethics Committee opinion indicated that the Committee considered an ALJ to be an "adjudicative officer."'' This characterization brings the ALJ within the Code of Judicial Conduct and
prohibits him from serving as a consultant or representative for a
law firm in a case over which he previously presided.' 82 The State
Bar of New Mexico, without applying the CJC, indicated that a
hearing officer fulfills a judicial role in a quasi-judicial forum. 8 a
Hearing officers, therefore, are precluded from appearing before
their forums because of the implications of improper influence. 8 Illinois has adopted a similar position by requiring hearing officers to
be guided by the CJC as to disqualification and avoidance of the
appearance of impropriety.' 85
Application by analogy avoids the potential dispute that may
arise when AL's are considered to be "judicial officers" in violation
of the separation of powers.' 86 Although ALJ's perform a variety of
judicial functions, they are not officers of a judicialsystem by virtue
of their status as administrative employees under the executive
branch. 87 This would appear to defeat any direct application of the
CJC to state administrative law judges without express adoption by
a state legislature.
178. Id.
179. Arizona Comm. on Rules of Professional Conduct, Op. 88-04 (1988); Arizona
Comm. on Rules of Professional Conduct, Op. 87-2 (1987).
180. Arizona Comm. on Rules of Professional Conduct, Op. 87-2 (1987). The Committee analogized Arizona cases that disapproved of judicial ex parte communications, thus implying that the ALJ should be treated under judicial standards.
181. Arizona Comm. on Rules of Professional Conduct, Op. 88-04 (1988).
182. Id.
183. State Bar of New Mexico Bar Advisory Opinions Comm., Op. 1985-7 (1985).
184. Id.
185. ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct, Illinois State Bar Association Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 87-14 (1988).
186, See infra notes 236-51 and accompanying text.
187. See MODEL CODE, supra note 4, Compliance; ABA PROPOSED DRAFT, supra note
4,at 42. See also PBA Comm. on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
89-86 (1989).

94

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

SUMMER

1990

(c) The inapplicability of the CJC to ALJ's.-States that have
declined to apply the Code of Judicial Conduct to state administrative law judges have questioned the legal foundation of such an application. 188 When it first addressed the issue, the Michigan Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics concluded that the CJC,
read in conjunction with the Michigan Administrative Procedure
Act and ABA ethics opinions, would seem to apply to ALJ's. 89 The
Committee refused to completely endorse this view; however, it did
note that it would consider the relevant facts in each situation to
determine the extent to which the CJC would be applicable. 9 ' Later
reconsideration of the issue led the Committee to state: "[I]n the
absence of a definitive legal resolution of the question, this Committee is still not prepared to view the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct as directly applicable to administrative law judges."'' The
Committee, however, analyzed the appropriate CJC provisions as if
they were applicable. 9 2 The Legal Ethics Committee of the District
of Columbia Bar also declined to apply the Code of Judicial Conduct
to a hearing examiner who acted in a quasi-judicial capacity. 93 Noting that a hearing examiner is not an "officer of a judicial system"
but an employee of an administrative agency, the Committee reasoned that the Code of Judicial Conduct was inapplicable. 9"
Although some state ethics committees have declined to apply
the CJC to administrative law judges, there is evidence that this is
not a hard-line position. For example, the Michigan Committee on
Professional and Judicial Ethics indicated: "As administrative law
judges continue to undertake greater portions of the decision making
in Michigan, rather than simply acting as policy enforcers, the rationale for applying the Code of Judicial Conduct to their actions
will be all the more compelling."' 95
188. See Michigan Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Informal Op. CI-633
(1981) ("The Committee's caution as regards to finding the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct directly applicable to administrative law judges seems particularly well-advised in light of
our understanding that the Judicial Tenure Committee took the position only last year that it
lacked jurisdiction over such officials because they are not 'judges' within the meaning of GCR
932.3(b)."); Legal Ethics Comm. of the District of Columbia Bar, Informal Op. 133 (1984).
189. Michigan Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Informal Op. CI-351 (1978).
190. Id.
191. Michigan Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Informal Op. CI-633 (1981).
192. Id.
193. District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 133 (1986).
194. Id.
195. Michigan Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Informal Op. CI-351 (1978).
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V.

Inadequacies of the Present Approach

The divergent results reached by state ethics committees demonstrates why an ad hoc application of the CJC is undesirable. The
lack of uniformity in this area places a great burden on administrative law judges because there are few specific guidelines to follow.
The states have continued to develop alternative approaches as a
means of compensating for the lack of a binding ALJ conduct code.
One such approach is the establishment of limitations on the practice
of law for part-time AL's. 1'" The jurisdictions that have considered
such limitations have not treated the matter with uniformity. 19 7 For
example, the West Virginia Bar Association resolved that a lawyer
could serve as a hearing examiner for a state human rights commission while a member of his firm represented clients before that commission, provided certain safeguards were followed.1 98 In Indiana,
part-time commissioners may represent clients before all courts except those that approve the commissioners' decisions."' In contrast,
New Mexico,200 Ohio, 20 1 and New York20 2 Bar Association opinions
prohibit quasi-judicial officers from practicing law or appearing in
their own forum. Virginia opinions have adhered to both positions
when applied to various examiners.203
196,
197,
198.

See West Virginia State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 87-02 (1987).
Id.
The safeguards provided that the lawyer could serve as a hearing examiner if he:
(I) does not hear a case in which he or any member of his firm has been
previously involved, or in which a lawyer or his firm is involved as counsel, or a
client of the firm is a party;
(2) does not knowingly agree to hear a case involving a major uncontested
legal issue in which his law firm has a present interest;
(3) disqualifies himself in the event a conflict develops unless all parties
concerned, after full disclosure, agree in writing that he may continue to act as a
hearing examiner; and
(4) does not state or imply to any client of his own or his firm that his
service as a hearing examiner provides an opportunity to influence the
commission.
West Virginia State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Informal Op. 85-01 (1985).
199. See id. (citing an unidentified Indiana advisory opinion).
200. New Mexico State Bar Advisory Opinions Comm., Op. 1985-7 (1985).
201. Ohio State Bar Association Comm. on Legal Ethics and Professional Conduct, Op.
34 (1981 ) ("referees employed by judges in the general division of the Court of Common Pleas
may not practice in that division of the Court").
202. New York State Bar Association Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 543 (1982)
(prohibits a hearing officer in tax assessment cases from representing private clients in the
same type of proceeding in the same jurisdiction).
203. In Virginia, part-time commissioners in chancery for divorce may represent clients
before the court that appointed them. Virginia State Bar Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics,
Op. 670 (1985). In contrast, part-time hearing examiners for the state employment commission may not. Virginia State Bar Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 549 (1984). Additionally, a lawyer who serves as a hearing officer in special education due process hearings may not
appear as an advocate in similar but unrelated hearings or in appellate hearings in other juris-
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The state central panel system, designed to make the ALJ more
independent of agency influence, is another attempt by states to alleviate the problems of potential ALJ bias or impropriety. 0 4 Nevertheless, this effort only addresses part of the problem. Additionally,
some state agencies have adopted their own ethical codes for
ALJ's. 0 5 For example, Pennsylvania's Public Utility Commission requires its ALJ's to abide by an agency enforced code of conduct. 206
The enactment of legislative reforms by some states indicates at
least a recognition of the problem. West Virginia expanded the jurisdiction of its Judicial Investigation Commission, which enforces the
Judicial Code of Ethics, to include family law masters.20 7 Similarly,
Indiana amended its state administrative procedures to provide
ALJ's with greater restrictions on judicial communications20 8 and
disqualification,10 so that violations of prescribed conduct could result in a Class A misdemeanor charge.21 0 Indiana has also attempted
to address the problem of excessive outside influence on ALJ's by
introducing a bill to the Indiana Legislature barring the use of undue influence to sway the outcome of administrative hearings. 211 The
bill recommended that the hearing process be brought under the
same ethical code as trial judges, and proposed imposing the Code of
Judicial Conduct on participants in state administrative hearings. 1 2
The Indiana Attorney General, in proposing the reform, cited the
tremendous pressure often exerted on hearing officers by hospital
and nursing home lobbyists.21 3
These approaches alone, however, are inadequate to remedy the
problem. There is an unavoidable appearance of bias inherent in the
structure of the administrative adjudicatory system when an agency
ALJ presides in litigation between its employing agency and a private party.2" It is virtually impossible for an ALJ to convey the imdictions in the state. Virginia State Bar Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 583 (1984).
204. See supra notes 108-16 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Utility Commission Act, 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN §§ 304,
319 (Purdon 1978).
206. Id.
207. In West Virginia, family law masters fill a quasi-judicial position created by the
legislature. The masters have authority to enter temporary support and custody orders, and
make recommended findings to the circuit court. See West Virginia State Bar Legal Ethics
Comm., Informal Op. 85-01 (1985).
208. IND. CODE ANN. § 4-21.5-3-11 (Burns 1986).
209. Id. § 4-21.5-3-12.
210. See id. § 4-21.5-3-36.

211. U.P.I.,
Dec. 30, 1984 (Nexis, Nexis library, Wires file).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Segal, supra note 64, at 1426.
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age of an impartial factfinder in such a situation.21 5 "As long as administrative law judges are employees of the agencies that appear
before them, their independence is suspect, and the ability of an
agency to exert improper influence over them is ever-threatening."2 '
Steps that have been taken to ensure that ALJ's act independently of
their agencies have not gone far enough. Freedom from bias, coercion, or outside influence affecting the fairness of the decision or the
decision itself must be safeguarded for ALJ's, as it is for judges and
judicial officers."'
The possibility that agencies will exert undue influence upon
ALJ's compromises the integrity of the system.2 1 ALJ's are vulnerable to a variety of subtle pressures because the agency generally controls promotional opportunities, support staff, scheduling, and personal reputation of the AU. 9 Conflict seems inevitable given the
hybrid nature of the ALJ role: independent adjudicator and agency
employee. The public perception that ALJ's are not unbiased and
impartial because they are agency employees highlights the need for
reform.2 20
VI. Legislative Proposal: Pennsylvania Should Elect to Make the
CJC Applicable to State Administrative Law Judges
The current approach-permanent ALJ assignment to a particular agency-is recognized by many as flawed. 221 This system creates the appearance of bias in favor of the agency and is counterproductive to the goal of providing an ALJ who is fair, objective, and
free from agency bias. Both commentators and administrative law
judges have recognized the need for the establishment of an effective
system, similar to that controlling judges, to guide the removal, discipline, and compulsory retirement of ALJ's. 2
A binding conduct code imposed upon ALJ's could remedy
some of the glaring problems that exist in the present system. The
ABA proposed revision to the Code of Judicial Conduct opens the
215. "[So long as that judge has offices in the same building as the agency staff, so long
as the seal of the agency adorns the bench on which that judge sits, so long as that judge's
assignment to the case is by the very agency whose actions or contentions that judge is being

called on to review, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for that judge to convey the
image of being an impartial fact finder." Id.
216. E. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 3-4.
217. Lussier, supra note 3, at 777.
218. E. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 6.
219. Id. at 6-7.
220. Id. at 5.
221. See supra notes 214-20 and accompanying text.
222. Segal, supra note 64, at 1426. See also Levinson, supra note 46, at 752-53.
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door for Pennsylvania and other states to effectuate change by electing to make the CJC applicable to state administrative law judges. 2 3
Such an election by the states is both feasible and desirable. Currently, there are indications that Pennsylvania would support the
election of the CJC; the advisory opinions of the Pennsylvania Bar
Association Ethics Committee have been amenable to application of
the CJC by analogy. 24
A.

Advantages to Application

Application of the Code of Judicial Conduct to administrative
law judges would provide ALJ's with advanced knowledge of the
standards of conduct expected of them. Presumably, ALJ's would
prefer to receive prior notice of unacceptable conduct than to be informed of it in a disciplinary proceeding. The confusion currently
experienced by ALJ's as to what constitutes unprofessional judicial
conduct is evidenced by the many requests for advisory opinions
made to bar association ethics committees each year. 2 5
The CJC, if made applicable to Pennsylvania ALJ's, would advise the ALJ under Canon 2 to avoid impropriety or the appearance
of impropriety in official proceedings. Applied to an ALJ, this could
be interpreted to mean that no overt favoritism should be shown to
the agency during the administrative hearing. Additionally, Canon 3
would mandate that ALJ's perform the duties of their office diligently and impartially. Ideally, such standards would encourage
agencies to abstain from questioning an ALJ's benefit allowance
rate. 2 The CJC would ban an ALJ from ex parte communications
on a pending case outside the formal proceeding and would require
him to disqualify himself if his impartiality might be questioned. 2
Although the requirement of disqualification for bias would duplicate some existing statutory standards that'apply to ALJ's, the CJC
would provide more detailed guidance on improper conduct before
such conduct occurs and would give the existing standards a more
223. See generally ABA PROPOSED DRAFT, supra note 4.
224. See supra notes 164-68, 173-78 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 153-95 and accompanying text.
226. On the federal level, programs requiring agency review of decisions of ALJ's who
allowed benefits in 70 percent or more of their decisions were found violative of the APA. See
Association of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C. 1984). The
court found that such programs could reasonably pressure ALJ's to render fewer allowance
decisions and influence some outcomes. Id. at 1142.
227. See MODEL CODE, supra note 4, Canon 3(A)(4). See also Levinson, supra note 46,
at 752.
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viable enforcement mechanism.2 2 8 Application of the CJC would
prohibit an ALJ from serving as a member of a board of directors of
a business corporation,22 9 or from hearing a case in which the ALJ
has a financial or other interest, 230 and would restrict questionable
quasi-judicial and extra-judicial activities. 3 1
Perhaps the most significant effect of electing to apply the CJC
to AL's would be the change in public perception of bias inherent
in the administrative adjudicatory system. With concrete standards
to govern ALJ behavior, the public perception of ALJ's as biased
and partial agency actors will be alleviated, and would finally bring
uniformity to a currently uncertain area. A concrete code that sets
ethical standards and provides a punishment mechanism would help
to alter the perception of impartiality in the adjudicatory process.
An election to apply the CJC to administrative law judges
would ease the interpretation problem experienced by state ethics
committees, who are uncertain about how to treat ALJ inquiries.
The CJC would be easy for state agencies to implement, and would
provide certainty in application. The jurisdiction of the Judicial In232
quiry and Review Board could be expanded to encompass ALJ's.
Alternatively, a separate Administrative Inquiry and Review Board
could be implemented to deal exclusively with agency grievances and
misconduct allegations.
B. Problems to Overcome
The above recommendations are not without associated
problems. A further expansion of the Code of Judicial Conduct to
administrative law judges may be viewed by some as a further relaxation of the separation of powers.2 33 Many critics of the present administrative system believe that there has been too much judicialization, which endangers the entire administrative process.23 4 The
current practice of hiring ALJ's from previous agency service will
continue to raise questions of ALJ impartiality. Additionally, adoption of the Code of Judicial Conduct will only serve to codify many
228.
n.108.

229.

MODEL CODE, supra note

4, Canon 3(C). See also Levinson, supra note 46, at 752

MODEL CODE, supra note 4, Canon 5(C)(2).
230. Id., Canon 3(C), 5(C). See also Levinson, supra note 46, at 753 (advocating the
application of the CJC to federal administrative law judges: "if these provisions are salutary
when applied to judges, they appear just as appropriate for application to AL's.").
231. Id., Canon 5, 6.
232. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
233. See infra notes 236-51 and accompanying text.
234. See deSeife, supra note 73.
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ethical procedures that some agencies already unofficially embrace.
Arguably, agencies would also lose some element of control over
their AL's if outside standards are imputed to govern their conduct.
A literal application of the CJC could also create interpretive
problems. For example, Canon 2 states that a judge should avoid the
appearance of impropriety. As previously indicated, the agency system itself gives rise to some presumptions of bias or impropriety.
Reconciliation between the literal meaning of the CJC and the basic
agency structure would be difficult without some modifications of the
CJC. Due to the unique characteristics of AL's, a separate code of
conduct exclusively for AL's could be the ultimate answer to this
problem."3 ' Nevertheless, in light of the current disorganization of
the ALJ system, perhaps the states are better equipped to reconcile
their Codes with the unique needs of their AL's.
C. Reconciling the Problems with Separation of Powers
A characteristic feature of the United States Constitution is the
separation of functions among three co-equal branches of government-legislative, executive, and judicial.2 3 The separation of powers principle acts in a broad sense to confine to each branch those
powers that it has been delegated by the Constitution. 37 In theory,
the checks and balances imposed upon each branch act as safeguards
against one branch attempting to exercise powers expressly delegated
to another.2 38 In reality, the three powers are often blended together
and commonly interact. 3 9
235. At least one ALJ organization has endorsed a model code of judicial conduct for
federal ALJ's. See ABA PROPOSED DRAFT, supra note 4, at 42 (citing Model Code of Judicial Conduct for Federal Administrative Law Judges, endorsed by the National Conference of
AL's in Feb. 1989).
236. The United States Constitution, in the first three articles, provides for the establishment of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. U.S. CONST. arts. 1, II,
Ill.
237. The framers of the Constitution sought to create a government which would be free
from the tyranny that could result from a concentration of power in one branch. See I J.
STEIN, supra note 51, § 3.01.
238. In theory, the system of checks and balances works well. Each branch
carries out
those powers that they have been delegated by the Constitution. In practice, however, the strict
separation that the theory advances does not exist. Occasionally, the President makes laws by
issuing executive orders, and may take on additional legislative functions in times of crisis.
Courts often take it upon themselves to legislate. The commingling of functions within an
agency, therefore, is not necessarily as unusual or evil as some believe. See deSeife, supra note
73, at 234-35.
239.
The Constitution itself points the way by explicitly providing for blending.
It provides that the President shall participate in the legislative process by approving or vetoing bills and in the judicial process by exercising the power of
pardon, that the House shall act executively in impeaching.officers, that the Sen-
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In many ways, administrative agencies defy the strict interpretation of separation of powers by the fusion of their legislative, executive, and judicial functions. In effect, agencies combine under one

roof the three powers that the Constitution sought to separate. 40
This intermingling of functions has caused many to consider administrative agencies to be a virtual fourth branch of government." 1 Despite the vague constitutional underpinnings upon which such a delegation of power is based, the Supreme Court has consistently
supported congressional delegation of legislative and judicial power
to administrative agencies. 242
The doctrine of separation of powers does not necessarily preclude a certain mixture of these functions. To perform properly, administrative agencies should be allowed to exercise quasi-legislative,

quasi-executive, and quasi-judicial functions. 43 Each function should
be assessed under the standards set forth by the respective branch."
Thus, the adequacy of ALJ performance in their adjudicatory role
should be assessed from the judicial perspective. Judicial power
should be conferred upon agencies if they are to adjudicate important rights, even if the particular power has been traditionally exer-

cised only by the courts." Mixing adjudicative functions with administrative and rulemaking functions enables agencies to utilize
their expertise to implement regulatory policies in a way that might
not be possible within rigidly separated boundaries.2 46 Furthermore,
agencies have a greater ability to accomplish their statutory mandate
ate shall act judicially in trying impeachments, and that the Senate shall participate in an executive function in advising on and consenting to appointments to
public office.
I K. DAVIS, supra note 54, § 2.5, at 73.
240. See deSeife, supra note 73, at 233-34.
241. Id. See also Pops, supra note 132.
242. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); State of Az. v. State of Cal., 373 U.S.
546 (1963); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414
(1944); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940). The Supreme Court
has invalidated only two delegations to administrative agencies. See Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935).
243. See deSeife, supra note 73, at 236.
244. See id. The author suggests that any proposed agency standards be assessed at the
proper level. Thus, any proposed standards in rulemaking functions should be assessed from
the legislative perspective, any changes in executive functions ought to be proposed on the
basis of enforcement standards, and the adequacy of their adjudicatory role should be assessed
from the judicial perspective. Id.
245. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (the exercise of adjudicative functions
by administrative bodies is not a withdrawal of the judicial function from the courts in contravention of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers); I K. DAvIs, supra note 54, §
2.6, at 79.
246. Fallon, Of Legislative Courts. Administrative Agencies, and Article I1, 101 HARV.

L.

REV.

916, 935 (1988).
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with the combination of functions.24 1
The fourteenth amendment due process clause does not embrace
the federal concept of separation of powers for the states, and leaves
the states free to allocate such powers as the states deem necessary. 8 Practically all state constitutions provide for some degree of
separation of powers.249
Separation of powers does not prohibit an ALJ from complying
with judicial procedures in the interest of due process and providing
a fair hearing. 250 The Code of Judicial Conduct currently encompasses inferior judicial officers who perform similar functions to
those carried out by ALJ's.25 1 A further extension to include ALJ's
would not overstep the bounds of constitutional authority. Since they
function as the trial judges of the administrative system, ALl's
should be evaluated like trial judges without reference to their actual
constitutional status.
VII.

Conclusion

The increased judicialization of administrative law judges requires that a comprehensive code of conduct be implemented to overcome perceptions of bias and partially inherent in the administrative
adjudicatory process. Administrative law judges are subject to intense agency pressures that are not experienced by the independent
judiciary. Subtle forms of influence exist and are perpetuated by an
administrative system that inherently controls ALJ action. Public
perceptions of biased administrative law judges indicate that ethical
reforms are needed, and actual incidents of ALJ misconduct reinforce this need.
The proposed revisions to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
give states the opportunity to promulgate and implement a workable
code of conduct to guide ALJ behavior. Our system of justice mandates that decisionmakers be neutral and honest when acting in an
adjudicatory capacity. Since the administrative hearing process is an
integral part of our legal system, it should be made to conform to the
principles of justice "upon which our legal system is grounded. 25 2
247. Id.
248. See International Bhd. of Teamsters Union, Local 309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470
(1950) (the fourteenth amendment leaves the states free to distribute the powers of government between their legislative and judicial branches).
249. See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. V, § 1 (1968).
250. See supra notes 78-81, 121-26 and accompanying text.
251. See MODEL CODE, supra note 4, Compliance.
252. See E. THOMAS, supra note 2, at 9.
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Enforcement of standards of ethical conduct cannot, and should not,
be left to the conscience of the individual. The Code of Judicial Conduct embodies principles that all decisionmakers, including those
who are "technically" under a different branch of government,
should strive to follow. As vital decisionmakers, ALJ's wield a great
deal of power because they adjudicate important individual rights in
a quasi-judicial, if not judicial, context. As such, ALJ's should be
held to the same standards as their judicial counterparts.
Karen S. Lewis

